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China , Bangladesh

China's construction of a sophisticated submarine base in Bangladesh has stirred unease in India and the wider Indo-Pacific strategic community. This development highlights the deepening strategic ties between China and Bangladesh, potentially altering the regional balance of power.

Defense analysts caution that the base could offer China a new operational hub for its submarines in the Bay of Bengal, in close proximity to crucial Indian naval installations, including a nuclear submarine facility. Such an enhanced presence may impede India's efforts to extend its naval influence in the region.

Bangladesh's growing defense cooperation with China is well-documented. China ranks as Bangladesh's second-largest arms supplier, trailing only Pakistan. This trend raises concerns among Indian strategists, who now face the challenge of countering China's expanding presence in Bangladeshi naval bases.

Although Chinese-supplied weaponry doesn't pose a direct threat to India, Beijing's deepening involvement with Bangladesh could significantly impact India's long-term Indo-Pacific strategy. China has solidified its influence through a 2002 defense agreement encompassing military training and equipment provision, with a notable emphasis on naval capabilities.

India previously wielded some influence in Sri Lanka, successfully dissuading it from hosting Chinese surveillance vessels. However, Bangladesh, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, may prove less amenable to Indian concerns.

Despite traditionally warm relations with India, Hasina has overseen a rapid strengthening of diplomatic and economic ties with China. Her pursuit of closer defense cooperation with China provides Beijing with an opportunity to make substantial inroads into Bangladesh's strategic affairs.

Bangladesh's aspiration to emerge as a regional maritime power aligns with China's interests. Following the supply of two refurbished submarines to Bangladesh, China embarked on the construction of a substantial submarine base, inaugurated by Sheikh Hasina last March alongside Chinese officials.

Of particular concern is the base's extensive dry dock, suggesting maintenance and overhaul capabilities that raise questions about China's true intentions for the facility.

The $1.21 billion base, financed and developed by China, is likely to render Bangladesh reliant on China for maintenance services. This dependency will complicate Bangladesh's ability to disentangle itself and will compel the Indian Navy to contend with the presence of Chinese submarines in close proximity to India's Andaman and Nicobar command.

The base's capacity to accommodate more submarines than Bangladesh currently possesses hints at either an expansion of the Bangladeshi fleet (potentially with Chinese vessels) or the direct utilization of the base by Chinese submarines, ostensibly to assist in training Bangladeshi submariners.

This scenario would entail a sustained Chinese military presence on Bangladeshi territory, presenting a deeply disconcerting prospect for India.

In conclusion, China's establishment of a submarine base in Bangladesh underscores the evolving strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. India faces the challenge of navigating this changing landscape while safeguarding its interests and regional influence.